Citation
Zhang, M., Yang, S., Nayak, K., Zhang, F. “Boost+: Equitable, Incentive-Compatible Block Building.” arXiv:2602.04007v1 [cs.CR] (Feb 3, 2026). Yale University / Duke University / IC3.
Core Problem
MEV-Boost has become highly centralized due to integration — builders co-locate with large searchers, gaining privileged access to high-value order flow. This:
- Distorts competition (integrated builders have systematic advantage)
- Reduces blockspace efficiency (non-integrated searchers lose)
- Obscures MEV flow transparency
Proposal: Boost+
Boost+ decouples block building into two phases:
- Collecting transactions (from all searchers equally)
- Ordering transactions (applying the allocation algorithm)
The key mechanism is MBoost+, built around a “default algorithm” that ensures:
Incentive Properties
| Party | Property | Condition |
|---|---|---|
| All builders | Truthful bidding is dominant strategy | Always |
| Searchers (conflict-free txs) | Truthful reporting is dominant | Always |
| Searchers (competing txs) | Truthful reporting is dominant | Whenever default algorithm dominates |
Even if a searcher CAN technically integrate with a builder, non-integration combined with truthful bidding still dominates any deviation for conflict-free transactions.
The Default Algorithm
An empirically-informed algorithm that:
- Is applied when no builder provides a better block than the default
- Uses historical transaction data to characterize which transactions should naturally be included
- Creates a “baseline” that all builders must beat, ensuring competitive tension even with few builders
Why This Matters
Current MEV-Boost has no mechanism preventing builder-searcher integration from being a dominant strategy. Boost+ makes integration non-profitable for conflict-free transactions, which are the vast majority of block content.
Integration is profitable today because:
- Integrated builders see order flow before non-integrated builders
- This gives an information advantage for ordering and MEV extraction
Boost+ eliminates this advantage by ensuring the collecting phase is transparent and all builders have equal access.
Relationship to Existing Work
- More concrete than SUAVE’s vision of a decentralized block building marketplace
- More immediately implementable than ePBS
- Complementary to BuilderNet (which uses TEEs to achieve similar ordering fairness)
- Addresses the fundamental incentive problem that BuilderNet addresses via hardware trust
Related Pages
- BuilderNet and Decentralized Block Building — TEE-based approach to the same problem
- PBS and MEV-Boost — Current centralization; integration problem
- Exclusive Order Flow and the Builder Flywheel — Why integration creates OFA flywheel
Key Sources
- Boost+: Equitable, Incentive-Compatible Block Building (Zhang, Yang, Nayak, Zhang, Yale/Duke/IC3, Feb 2026)