Polymarket — Adversarial Due Diligence Report

Report Date: 2026-03-26 Protocol: Polymarket (Prediction Market / Event Derivatives) Legal Entity: Blockratize, Inc. d/b/a Polymarket.com Chain: Polygon (PoS) Collateral: USDC.e (transitioning to native USDC) Category: Hybrid Decentralized Prediction Market / Event Derivatives Researcher Stance: Guilty until proven innocent

⚠️ LEAD WITH THE MOST ALARMING FINDING

Polymarket has on at least one documented occasion overridden its own UMA decentralized oracle to reverse a market resolution it disliked. In the Barron Trump/DJT memecoin market, UMA token holders voted to resolve “No” through the ostensibly trustless dispute mechanism. Polymarket unilaterally reversed this outcome. The platform’s “decentralized” resolution narrative is selectively applied — the company retains and exercises a de facto override capability with no published rules governing when it will be used.

Additionally: A Columbia University study found that up to 25% of Polymarket’s total trading volume (~$4.5 billion) is likely wash trading — fabricated activity with no real market information content. Sports markets reached 45% fake volume. Election markets peaked at 95% fake volume in the week of March 24, 2025.

These two facts — opaque platform-level oracle override + quarter of volume potentially fabricated — sit underneath one of the most aggressively marketed “crowd wisdom” platforms in crypto.

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Verdict: MEDIUM RISK — Legitimate platform with serious structural integrity and centralization concerns that are categorically different from typical DeFi rug risks.

Confidence Level: High (named founder, massive public record, regulatory filings, independent academic studies)

Polymarket is a real and operational prediction market platform with verifiable leadership, $74M+ in institutional funding from Founders Fund, General Catalyst, and Vitalik Buterin, and a $2B strategic investment from ICE (NYSE parent) at an $8B valuation. The founder (Shayne Coplan) is publicly identified, interview-accessible, and subject to FBI-level scrutiny — making exit scam risk effectively zero. The platform processed $3B+ in election volume in 2024 and has become a genuine data asset.

However, Polymarket’s adversarial risks are categorically different from conventional DeFi rug pulls. The real risks are: (1) a decentralized oracle architecture that is actually controlled by two UMA token whales; (2) documented platform-level override of decentralized resolution; (3) a Columbia University-documented wash trading problem affecting 25% of volume; (4) USDC dependency giving Circle unilateral freeze authority; (5) an unresolved CFTC compliance history now legally resolved but revealing a pattern of operating first and complying later; and (6) an off-chain CLOB operator who controls order matching with no on-chain verifiability.

Top 3 Risks

  1. Polymarket overrides its own oracle when it chooses — The Barron Trump/DJT memecoin case: UMA resolved “No.” Polymarket reversed it. The “decentralized resolution” marketing claim is demonstrably false when the platform disagrees with the outcome.
  2. UMA oracle governance is captured by two whales who control >50% of votes — One individual holds 7.5M of 20M staked UMA tokens. A single entity can resolve any disputed market however they choose. The March 2025 $7M Ukraine mineral deal manipulation was a direct exercise of this structural vulnerability.
  3. Columbia University study: 25% of total volume (~$4.5B) is likely wash trading — The platform’s core claim of “crowd wisdom” via volume-weighted markets depends entirely on volume representing genuine belief formation. If 25–60% of volume in election markets is fabricated, the information signal is compromised.

Top 3 Positive Signals

  1. Named, extremely public founder with institutional accountability anchors — Shayne Coplan had his home raided by the FBI, his phone seized, and was under DOJ/CFTC criminal investigation. Investigations were dropped in July 2025. The level of scrutiny he survived without charges is an extremely strong legitimacy signal.
  2. $2B investment from ICE (NYSE parent) at $8B valuation — The Intercontinental Exchange’s strategic commitment is the most powerful possible institutional validation. ICE owns the New York Stock Exchange and is subject to SEC and CFTC oversight. They would not commit $2B to a platform with exit-scam risk.
  3. CFTC-regulated relaunch in the U.S. — September 2025 acquisition of QCX (CFTC-licensed derivatives exchange) for $112M, receipt of CFTC no-action letter, and December 2025 US relaunch demonstrate genuine regulatory engagement rather than perpetual offshore evasion.

2. TEAM ASSESSMENT

Primary Identified Individual: Shayne Coplan

Role: Founder and CEO, Polymarket / Blockratize, Inc.

ClaimSourceVerified?
Born 1998, raised on Upper West Side of ManhattanWikipedia, Fortune, NBC News✅ VERIFIED — multiple independent sources
Studied CS at NYU, dropped out freshman yearWikipedia, multiple profiles✅ VERIFIED — consistent across all sources
Participated in 2014 Ethereum ICO at ~$0.30Multiple interviewsPARTIALLY VERIFIED — consistent claim; no independent documentary proof, but matches ETH ICO timing
Founded Polymarket in June 2020CFTC enforcement order, Crunchbase✅ VERIFIED — CFTC order establishes June 2020 as commencement of operations
Home raided by FBI, November 14, 2024NBC News, CNBC, ABC News, Fortune✅ VERIFIED — FBI confirmed; no charges filed
DOJ/CFTC investigations dropped July 2025Multiple news sources✅ VERIFIED
Became world’s youngest self-made billionaire, October 2025Bloomberg Billionaires Index, Forbes✅ VERIFIED
Prior project: Union Market (DeFi) — abandoned for PolymarketMultiple interviewsUNVERIFIED — no independent record of Union Market found

GitHub: Shayne Coplan’s personal GitHub handle is not publicly prominent. Polymarket’s organization (github.com/polymarket) has 95 repositories and active development activity (39+ weekly commits as of mid-2025). Core technology is built by the team, not just a named figurehead.

Twitter/X: @ShayneCoplan — Active and public. Post-FBI raid: “New phone, who dis?” — demonstrates personal public profile, not a disposable identity. No patterns of deleted tweets or bot followers found.

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/shaynecoplan/ — Public profile confirmed.

Personal website: No dedicated personal site identified; operates primarily via LinkedIn and Twitter presence.

Other Team Members

Unlike many DeFi protocols, Polymarket has identifiable non-founder team members:

  • Matthew Modabber — CMO; publicly confirmed POLY token and airdrop plans (October 2025)
  • Joey Krug — Partner at Founders Fund; board-level involvement (also co-founder of Augur, which Polymarket effectively replaced)

Full team roster is not publicly available beyond these named individuals.

Background Verification Summary

Prior regulatory history (VERIFIED, CRITICAL):

  • June 2020 — Polymarket launched and began offering event-based binary options
  • January 2022 — CFTC enforcement action: $1.4M fine, cease and desist, required wind-down of non-compliant markets and certification of compliance. Legal entity: Blockratize, Inc.
  • Post-2022 — Continued operating with geographic blocking of US users, but VPN circumvention was widely known and documented (CoinDesk confirmed two Americans trading from the US ahead of 2024 election)
  • November 2024 — FBI raid on founder’s home, phone seized; framed as investigation into CFTC settlement violation
  • July 2025 — DOJ and CFTC dropped all investigations

Pattern identification: Polymarket operated in a legal grey zone for 2+ years after its CFTC settlement — maintaining US headquarters, accepting VPN-circumventing US users, and growing aggressively while nominally barred. This is a “build fast, regularize later” strategy, not evidence of malicious intent, but it represents a documented history of compliance-through-appearances rather than compliance-in-substance.

3. THIRD-PARTY CONSENSUS

CFTC Enforcement Order (January 3, 2022) — VERIFIED PRIMARY SOURCE Source: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8478-22

Key findings from the actual order (not Polymarket’s summary):

  • Operated illegal unregistered “event markets” from June 2020 — 900+ separate markets
  • Markets constituted “swaps” under the Commodity Exchange Act
  • Required $1.4M civil penalty, cease and desist, market wind-down certification
  • Received reduced penalty for “substantial cooperation”
  • Company agreed to make no public statements denying the findings

DLA Piper Analysis (Independent Law Firm): Described the order as “the CFTC’s first major enforcement action in the blockchain space” since new chair Behnam took over. Significant precedent.

Ben Edelman Analysis (Privacy/Cybersecurity Researcher): Published independent analysis of Polymarket’s geofencing approach, noting it is “more of a risk mitigation strategy than a legal strategy” — the blocks are easily circumvented and the platform knows this.

Audit and Security Assessment

ChainSecurity Audit — CTF Exchange Contract: The Polymarket Exchange contract (custom smart contract for CTF/ERC-20 atomic swaps, EIP-712 order matching) was audited by ChainSecurity — a credible Swiss academic-rooted security firm. However:

  • No public PDF of the audit report was found via web search
  • Scope appears limited to the Exchange contract, not the full CTF or UMA oracle integration
  • No audit was identified for the proxy wallet system that was subsequently exploited in September 2024

Gnosis Conditional Token Framework (CTF) — EXTERNAL: The CTF (ERC-1155 contract at 0x4d97dcd97ec945f40cf65f87097ace5ea0476045 on Polygon) is Gnosis’s infrastructure, not Polymarket’s code. Gnosis CTF has been independently audited multiple times. This is a positive — Polymarket leverages audited third-party infrastructure rather than writing all core contracts from scratch.

September 2024 Security Breach — NOT in any audit: A third-party authentication provider (unnamed) was breached, enabling attackers to use “proxy function calls” to drain user USDC. $500K+ lost via phishing campaign. Polymarket did not disclose the provider name, affected user count, or total losses. This was a real security incident in production.

Independent Analyst Coverage

Columbia Business School Study (November 2025) — HIGH QUALITY INDEPENDENT SOURCE Source: SSRN — https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5714122 Authors: Yash Kanoria, Hongyao Ma, Rajiv Sethi, Allen Sirolly

Key findings (pre-peer-review SSRN working paper — not final):

  • ~25% of historical volume estimated as wash trading
  • ~$4.5B in likely wash transactions
  • Peak: 60% of weekly volume in December 2024; 95% of election market volume in week of March 24, 2025
  • 14% of 1.26M wallets flagged (consistent with ~177,000 accounts)
  • 45% of Sports market all-time volume estimated as wash trading
  • 14% of wallets flagged formed closed clusters seldom transacting with others
  • Likely motive: airdrop farming, not profit from trading

Caveat: Not yet peer-reviewed; Polymarket has disputed the methodology; independent professors from Rutgers called the narrative “politically motivated.” This is a serious study from an elite institution but should be weighted accordingly — directionally significant, not definitively quantified.

Wall Street Journal (October 2024): Reported that $30M in bets from four accounts moved Trump election odds significantly. Described as potential market manipulation, not just large-scale legitimate betting.

The Block (March 2025): Described Polymarket’s response to UMA oracle attack as calling it “unprecedented” — Polymarket’s own characterization of the manipulation event as unprecedented validates that it happened and was outside normal parameters.

Rekt News: No dedicated Polymarket analysis found. Absence is partially explained by Polymarket not fitting the “DeFi hack/rug” category Rekt specializes in.

Community Sentiment

Trustpilot reviews: Sharply polarized. Recurring complaints: arbitrary/incorrect market resolutions, frozen funds in restricted jurisdictions, unresponsive support, “rigged” UMA oracle outcomes, toxic moderation.

Reddit (r/Polymarket exists): Active community. Significant discussion of oracle disputes, UMA whale manipulation, and wash trading concerns. Not unanimous negative — split between users who trust the platform and those who experienced disputed resolutions.

Crypto Twitter/X: Platform is broadly popular and respected for election market accuracy. Critical voices focus on oracle manipulation and volume inflation. No major influencers with financial incentive to defend found in critical coverage.

4. ON-CHAIN FINDINGS

Contract Architecture

Chain: Polygon PoS Collateral: USDC.e (Bridged USDC), transitioning to native USDC via Circle partnership (announced 2025)

Key Contract Addresses (Polygon):

ContractAddressNotes
Conditional Token Framework0x4d97dcd97ec945f40cf65f87097ace5ea0476045Gnosis CTF — third-party, audited
CTF Exchange0x4bfb41d5b3570defd03c39a9a4d8de6bd8b8982ePolymarket custom — ChainSecurity audited
UMA AdapterPolygon network — address not independently confirmedUMA optimistic oracle integration

Architecture: Hybrid — off-chain CLOB for order matching, on-chain CTF for asset creation and settlement. EIP-712 signed orders. Proxy wallet intermediaries per user.

Oracle Risk — THE CRITICAL STRUCTURAL ISSUE

Polymarket uses UMA’s Optimistic Oracle (now MOOV2 as of August 2025) for market resolution.

UMA Token Concentration (CRITICAL):

  • 2 whale addresses control >50% of UMA voting power
  • 1 individual holds 7.5M of 20M staked UMA tokens (37.5% of staked supply)
  • March 2025: A single entity with 3 accounts holding 25% of votes (5M tokens) resolved the Ukraine mineral deal market incorrectly
  • After MOOV2 upgrade: Only 37 whitelisted addresses can propose resolutions — further concentrating oracle control

Polymarket’s Override Capability (MOST CRITICAL): Polymarket has exercised platform-level override of UMA resolutions at least once:

  • Barron Trump/DJT memecoin market: UMA voted “No.” Polymarket reversed it to “Yes.”
  • “Will Trump say China?”: Polymarket retroactively changed market rules mid-market, resolving “No” against initial user expectations
  • This means the “decentralized oracle” is not actually a constraint on Polymarket — it’s a default mechanism that Polymarket can override

What this means for users: When Polymarket says markets are “resolved by UMA’s trustless oracle,” this is misleading. UMA is the first layer. Polymarket is the actual layer of last resort with unilateral override capability and no published rules governing when it will be exercised.

Centralization Vector Map

VectorControlled ByRisk Level
Order matching (off-chain CLOB)Polymarket operatorHIGH — can censor orders, manipulate fills
Market resolution (first pass)Anyone staking $750 USDC.e bondMEDIUM
Market resolution disputeUMA token voters (2 whales control majority)CRITICAL
Market resolution overridePolymarket companyCRITICAL
USDC freezeCircle (centralized issuer)HIGH
Proxy wallet managementUser private key + Polymarket infrastructureMEDIUM
Proposer whitelist (MOOV2)UMA governance (whale-controlled)HIGH
Geographic accessPolymarket company + government regulatorsMEDIUM

USDC Dependency Risk

Polymarket is fully denominated in USDC. Implications:

  • Circle’s blacklist function can freeze any address, including user proxy wallets, at the smart contract level
  • This is not a theoretical risk — Circle froze USDC in 16 business wallets in a separate 2025 case, reigniting blacklist debate
  • Transition from USDC.e (bridged) to native USDC increases Circle dependency while reducing bridge risk
  • In a sanctions scenario, US regulators could compel Circle to freeze all Polymarket-associated wallets

Wash Trading Evidence

Source: Columbia University Business School, November 2025 (SSRN working paper, pre-peer-review)

Market TypeEstimated Wash Trading %
Sports45% all-time
Election (peak, Mar 24 week 2025)95%
Election (overall)17%
Politics12%
Crypto3%
Total (all markets)~25%

Total estimated fake volume: ~$4.5 billion Flagged wallets: 14% of 1.26M (approximately 177,000 accounts) Motive: Primarily airdrop farming (POLY token announced), not trading profit

Why this matters for prediction market integrity: The “wisdom of crowds” thesis that underpins Polymarket’s value proposition requires that market prices aggregate genuine beliefs. If up to 60% of weekly volume in election markets is fabricated activity with no information content, market prices cannot be treated as reliable probability estimates. They may still reflect genuine bettors’ views (the un-washed minority) but the signal-to-noise ratio is severely degraded.

2024 US Election Market — Specific Manipulation Claims

WSJ Report (October 2024): Four accounts placed $30M in coordinated bets moving Trump odds significantly above traditional polling.

Coindesk/The Block Analysis: The accounts were identified as operating from France — including the high-profile “French whale” that triggered the French ANJ investigation and eventually Polymarket’s France block.

Assessment: This incident has two valid interpretations: (a) legitimate large-scale bettors who genuinely believed Trump would win and were correct, or (b) coordinated market manipulation for political or financial purposes. The subsequent FBI raid on Coplan (investigating whether US users were trading) suggests US authorities were aware of and concerned about the manipulation question. No charges were filed.

5. RED FLAGS REGISTER

#FlagSeverityEvidenceWhy It Matters
1Polymarket overrides “decentralized” UMA oracle when it choosesCRITICALBarron Trump/DJT case: UMA resolved “No,” Polymarket reversed to “Yes” without published ruleset governing override; “Will Trump say China?” rule retroactively changedThe core security model — trustless oracle resolution — is demonstrably false. Polymarket retains editorial control over outcomes with no accountability mechanism.
2UMA oracle governance captured by 2 whales controlling >50% of votesCRITICALThe Block, CoinTelegraph, Orochi Network (March 2025): one entity holds 7.5M/20M staked UMA; Ukraine mineral deal resolution manipulated by 25% voter with 3 accountsAny market that goes to dispute is resolvable however the UMA whale wants. This is not a decentralized oracle — it’s a permissioned arbiter with a cryptographic veneer.
3Columbia University study: 25% of volume (~$4.5B) likely wash tradingCRITICALColumbia Business School / SSRN (Nov 2025): Network-Based Detection of Wash Trading — 14% of wallets flagged, sports 45%, election markets peaked 95%Polymarket’s “wisdom of crowds” claim requires genuine volume. If quarter of volume is fabricated, the information value of market prices is fundamentally compromised. Core product promise is undermined.
4CFTC enforcement action + FBI raidHIGHCFTC order (Jan 2022, cftc.gov); FBI raid confirmed by NBC News, CNBC (Nov 2024)Operated illegal derivatives markets for 2+ years. FBI criminal investigation. Even though resolved, establishes pattern of compliance-through-appearances rather than compliance-in-substance.
5Off-chain CLOB operator controls order matchingHIGHPolymarket technical docs; architecture inherently centralized at order book layerThe off-chain operator can censor orders, front-run traders, or selectively fill trades. No on-chain verifiability of matching integrity. Users cannot independently verify fair execution.
6$500K+ security breach via third-party auth provider (September 2024)HIGHThe Block (Sept 2024); Polymarket confirmed third-party breach but refused to name provider or disclose scaleReal user funds lost. Polymarket did not disclose the provider, user count, or total losses — minimal transparency on a live security failure.
7USDC/Circle centralization — freeze authorityHIGHCircle’s USDC terms; documented 16-wallet freeze in separate 2025 caseIn any regulatory enforcement scenario, Circle can freeze all Polymarket-associated USDC at a smart contract level. “Non-custodial” framing is misleading given this counterparty risk.
8MOOV2 restricts oracle proposers to 37 whitelist addressesHIGHUMA governance UMIP-189 (Aug 2025); The Block coverageResolution proposal centralized to 37 addresses. UMA defended this as accuracy improvement (99.7% vs 85.8%) but it represents a hard reversal of the open proposer model.
94-account $30M coordinated election bet (WSJ, Oct 2024)HIGHWall Street Journal, October 2024; French ANJ investigationCoordinated large-scale positioning by anonymous accounts moved market odds. Whether this is manipulation or informed large-bet — outcome cannot be verified. France responded with regulatory investigation and block.
10Proxy wallet architectureMEDIUMPolymarket docs; “1 of 1 multisig” per userFunds held in a smart contract intermediary rather than directly in user wallets. If Polymarket’s infrastructure has issues (access control bugs, platform suspension), wallet interaction may be blocked.
11Geographic bans expanding: 33+ countries, including Belgium and Colombia in 2025MEDIUMPolymarket help docs; crypto.news; gamblinginsider.comThe regulatory surface area is expanding. Each new country block reduces addressable market, liquidity, and platform survival probability in a fragmented global regulatory environment.
12$7M Ukraine mineral deal: no refunds despite acknowledged wrong resolutionMEDIUMPolymarket official statement (Mar 2025); CoinDesk, CoinTelegraphPolymarket explicitly acknowledged the outcome “went against user expectations and the platform’s own clarification” but refused refunds. Sets precedent that even acknowledged wrong resolutions will not be compensated.
13Coinbase CEO Armstrong mention markets incident (Oct 2025)MEDIUMMultiple crypto news sources; described as market manipulation during earnings callArmstrong allegedly read POLY mention market words from a list, manipulating market outcomes. Demonstrates “mention markets” are highly gameable by market participants with real-world influence.
14POLY token not yet launched — tokenomics fully opaqueLOWCMO confirmed token but no tokenomics published (as of research date)Cannot assess token distribution, insider allocation, or vesting. The Columbia study suggests significant wash trading was driven by airdrop farming speculation — the token announcement preceded the manipulation spike.
15Polymarket’s ChainSecurity audit not publicly indexedLOWChainSecurity mentioned in docs; no public PDF found via standard searchLimited transparency on what the audit covered and what findings were identified. Less critical than a DeFi lending protocol, but worth noting.

6. UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS

  1. What are the published rules governing Polymarket’s oracle override capability? At minimum two cases of platform override (Barron Trump, Trump China question) have been documented. No published policy governs when, how, or by whom these overrides can be triggered. This is the most important transparency gap.

  2. What is the exact scope and finding list of the ChainSecurity audit of the CTF Exchange contract? The audit is referenced but no public PDF was found. Specific findings, severity levels, and remediation status are unknown.

  3. Who were the four accounts behind the $30M Trump election bets, and is there any evidence of coordination with the platform? The Wall Street Journal identified coordinated activity; Polymarket and the FBI investigated; no charges filed. The actual identities and any platform-level coordination remain undisclosed.

  4. What triggered the FBI raid specifically — and what evidence was on Coplan’s seized phone? The DOJ/CFTC dropped investigations without charges. The specific evidence sought and found (if any) has not been disclosed. The raid occurred 7 days after the 2024 election when Polymarket’s political profile was at its peak.

  5. What is the published POLY tokenomics structure? CMO confirmed token and airdrop but no distribution schedule, insider allocation, lock-up periods, or utility mechanics have been published. The Columbia study wash trading spike correlates with airdrop speculation — POLY tokenomics matter enormously for understanding this.

  6. Has Polymarket refunded any users who lost funds in the September 2024 authentication breach? Polymarket confirmed the breach but declined to disclose the third-party provider, affected users, or losses. Whether any remediation was provided is unknown.

  7. Who are the 2 UMA whales controlling >50% of dispute voting, and are they affiliated with Polymarket? One individual holds 7.5M/20M staked UMA tokens. Their identity and any relationship with Polymarket management is unknown. A Polymarket/UMA affiliate controlling the oracle of last resort would be the most significant undisclosed conflict of interest.

  8. Does the ICE investment include any governance rights or board seats? ICE invested $2B at $8B valuation with data distribution rights and tokenization partnership. Whether ICE has governance rights, board representation, or veto powers over platform decisions was not disclosed.

7. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Is Polymarket a Rug Pull?

No. Polymarket fails every standard rug pull indicator:

  • Named, public, billionaire founder subject to FBI investigation
  • $2B from the NYSE parent company
  • 4 years of continuous operation
  • CFTC settlement (not evasion) with follow-up regulatory compliance
  • Real product with real users ($3B+ election volume in 2024)

What Does Polymarket Resemble?

Not like: Wonderland, Celsius, FTX, Terra/Luna — the classic DeFi rug/fraud pattern

Structurally similar to: Early FTX — a hybrid on-chain/off-chain exchange run by a young founder with institutional credibility, where the “decentralized” framing obscures significant operator control, and where trading volume metrics may not reflect genuine market depth. FTX was not a rug pull narrative early; it was a “build legitimacy fast, deal with the gaps later” platform.

Key distinction from FTX: Polymarket does not custody user funds in a centralized way — the CTF/USDC architecture genuinely gives users non-custodial control of outcome tokens (subject to Circle freeze risk). This eliminates the FTX-style “where did the user funds go” scenario.

Sustainability of Business Model

  • Revenue model: Polymarket charges no trading fees (plans to introduce fees with US relaunch)
  • Current monetization: data licensing (ICE deal), potential token launch
  • Fee-free model was a deliberate growth strategy — adoption over revenue — consistent with VC-backed model
  • Long-term: regulated US market with fee revenue + POLY token + ICE data distribution represents a viable business model
  • Risk: If POLY token airdrop farming represents the majority of current user engagement (Columbia study suggests this), post-airdrop retention may collapse

APPENDIX: KEY SOURCES

Primary Research Sources

Official Sources (Treated as Marketing Material)

Research conducted under adversarial methodology. Trust hierarchy: on-chain data → independent third-party analysis (CFTC enforcement, Columbia study) → community intelligence → digital footprints → official communications. Unverified claims labeled. Absence of evidence not treated as evidence of absence. Note: Polymarket is a prediction market, not a traditional DeFi protocol — risk vectors differ materially from lending/AMM protocols.